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PLEBISCITES AND THE PUBLIC PURSE:
U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Abstract
The United States is a distinctive case for studying the way extensive
direct democracy can affect fiscal policy. Every state in the Union allows voters to
decide certain ballot questions about how to raise and spend public revenue. The
U.S. record shows that large‐scale plebiscites fail to produce reliably “pro‐poor”
government finance. Direct citizen involvement in fiscal policy has not led to
uniformly equitable or financially sustainable state budgets. Nor has it mobilized
low‐income groups to express and defend their economic interests. When called
upon to make decisions about the amounts and purposes of statewide
government spending, the electorate is apt to disregard any hardship for poor
people. Political parties and advocacy organizations, working through
traditional representative institutions, are usually a more promising avenue for
fighting poverty.

The United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals commit countries to
do more to reduce the rate of poverty and to improve education and health care
for all. To reach these objectives, national fiscal policy must be made more “pro‐
poor” than it has been in most countries in the past. Greater citizen participation
has been offered as a promising means of bringing taxes and expenditures into
closer alignment with the resources and needs of lower‐income people (for
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discussion, see Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2003). Indeed, greater participation in
public affairs is itself an important element of the Millennium Development
Goals.
Participatory budgeting has worked reasonably well at the neighborhood
and municipal level, for example in the widely cited example of Porto Alegro,
Brazil (Inter‐American Development Bank 2000). Participation in national
budgets presents different challenges due to the greater scale of activities. One
possible way to engage large numbers of people in fiscal policy is through
plebiscites or direct democratic action. But how do countrywide fiscal plebiscites
work out in actuality?
The United States presents a unique case for exploring this question.
Although no federal system of direct democracy exists in the United States, every
state in the Union allows voters themselves to decide certain laws in the polling
booth, including questions about how to raise revenue and on what to spend it.
Some states are bigger than many independent countries; notable is California,
whose population today is about the same as Sudan’s, which would make
California the 33rd largest country in the world, ranked by population.
Depending on the jurisdiction, American voters have been taking part in
decisions about state government revenue and expenditure for more than a
century. While direct democracy is expanding around the world (Scarrow 2001),
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no other country has comparable experience of extensive plebiscitary fiscal
policy.1
U.S. state governments thus offer what may be the most relevant
perspective on how direct democracy might affect nationwide budgeting in
present‐day developing and transitioning countries – political units that are just
beginning to experiment with plebiscitary policymaking (Barczak 2001, Frey
2003). The U.S. record is cautionary: When voters take hold of the government’s
purse strings, they are apt to be even more tight‐fisted regarding the poor than
legislative bodies are. While other societies may be different, they most likely
will need to look beyond direct democracy to fashion pro‐poor fiscal positions.

Origins and Scope of Direct Democracy in the United States
American direct democracy has its genesis in the populist and progressive
movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These movements
were a reaction to the large and impersonal organizations that were gaining
ground in the United States, and they sought political remedies to the perceived
loss of small‐town and individualistic values (Hofstadter 1955). Populists and
progressives believed the nation’s official leaders had lost touch with ordinary
There is also plenty of direct democratic participation in local fiscal matters in the United States.
Literally thousands of cities and towns across the land have an initiative (citizens can place laws
on the ballot for approval or disapproval) and referenda (citizens can vote on public legislation).
that determine service fees, property tax rates, special local taxes or bond issues. Since this local
political history is less relevant to national fiscal policymaking, no more will be said about it here.
1
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people and that wealthy, entrenched economic interests were setting the policy
agenda for government. It was urgent and necessary, in this view, to open up or
circumvent the institutions that stood between citizen and government.
Activists at the time were very creative in thinking up new approaches
they thought would revitalize democracy, reduce corruption and make leaders
more responsive and accountable. Among the well‐known innovations in
governance from that period are the secret ballot, the non‐partisan primary
election, the city‐manager system of local government, and, of principle concern
in this paper, three related institutions of direct democracy. Each of the latter
offered a somewhat different way for going over the heads of the elite and
bringing important public decisions down to the grassroots for approval or
disapproval. Fueled by popular discontent, this trio of direct democratic
institutions was enacted into law across the United States in the early 1900s
(Goebel 2002, Piott 2003, Farmer 2001). 2
The most radical institution is the initiative, which allows voters to initiate
legislation through a petition drive. To put a proposed law on the ballot, a group
only needs to come up with legally acceptable wording and to gather a
predetermined number of legitimate signatures, thereby bypassing the
representative organs of government. Twenty‐four states and the District of
2

Rousseau is the most prominent philosopher to favor direct democracy. His ideas were influenced by
Swiss traditions. Later, U.S. reformers borrowed practices that had already been tried out in Switzerland.
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Columbia have the initiative (though their exact procedures differ in many
particulars).3 Since voters first placed a statewide measure on Oregon’s ballot in
1904, over two thousand statewide voter‐initiated ballot questions have appeared
across the nation (IRI 2002). The number of citizen initiatives has exploded since
the late 1970s, though they still total just a tiny fraction of the laws considered by
state legislatures. The odds are against approval: about 60% of these ballot
measures have been rejected. Sometimes thought of as the “fourth branch of
government” in the United States, a similar initiative process is almost unknown
anywhere else in the world.4
The second, less extreme, device for direct democratic action is the
referendum, by which legislatures may refer a statute to the voting public for
ratification. Because elected officials have a hand in the process, a referendum
does not sidestep formal, representative bodies to the same extent that a citizens’
initiative does. All 50 states now allow for referenda in one form or another, and
the process has become commonplace.5 In 2000, for instance, there were 133
statewide questions placed on the ballot by state legislatures, versus 71 placed on
the ballot by petition. In 2002, the figures were 149 statewide referenda, versus 53
3

Some states have an indirect initiative, where a group drafts and qualifies a proposition, then submits it to
the legislature for consideration.
4
New Zealand is the only other country with a similar initiative process, but has only used it twice
(Qvortrup 2001). Switzerland also has a federal initiative process, but only for consitutional amendments,
not for ordinary legislation. Several German lander provide for citizen initiatives, but they must pass
through legislative review first. See Dubois and Feeney (1998: 51-66).
5
A somewhat different type of referendum is the popular referendum, where a group petitions to have a
law already passed by the legislature submitted to the voters for approval.
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ballot questions from the people (IRI 2000, 2002). The approval rate of
legislatively referred measures is higher than for initiatives, with about 60%
winning voter endorsement (Cronin 1989: 197). Other countries besides the
United States make use of referenda, but only Switzerland does so with anything
close to the same frequency.
The third facet of direct democracy is the recall, which allows voters to
start a process to remove an elected official before his or her term of office
expires. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have the recall. This
institution is generally less relevant to fiscal issues (though the recent recall of
California’s governor was partly motivated by discontent with his handling of
the state budget deficit) and it will not be discussed further. For the balance of
this paper, the focus will be on statewide ballot questions and, in particular, on
voter initiatives.
Direct democracy has long been controversial. In Ancient Greece, Aristotle
and other philosophers rejected this form of governance because they believed
the average citizen is prone to make rash decisions. The framers of the U.S.
Constitution felt the same way, and they intentionally set up a representative
system to assure the careful deliberation of important collective issues. Further,
as Marx famously pointed out in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, there
is a historical link between direct democracy and tyranny, with dictators often
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using simplistic referenda as a means to secure or renew their power. Despite the
fears and objections, Americans have come to embrace direct democracy as a
legitimate alternative or supplement to other lawmaking institutions.
An odd coalition made up the direct democracy movement in the early
days. In most states, the first proponents were on the Left, and included labor
unions and suffragists. Conservative temperance organizations and religious
groups also took up the cause of direct democracy as a means to circumvent the
establishment or, at a minimum, to force it to pay attention to widely held but
out‐of‐favor views. This bimodal pattern continues today, with many ballot
issues springing from the far sides of the political spectrum. Rightwing issues
(tax limitations, mandatory sentencing, school vouchers) have attracted the most
attention, but leftwing causes (animal rights, medical marijuana use,
environmental controls) also have resonated with the electorate. Elite opinion
(political leaders, judges, editorial page writers) tends to reject as simplistic ballot
proposals from all quarters.
Citizen initiatives span a range of specific issues and causes. Most are
unrelated to the public purse, and concern election reform, public morality,
business regulation or other non‐financial problems. Over one initiative in four,
however, is about a revenue or tax measure (Tolbert 2001: 43). Also having a
fiscal impact are ballot initiatives that affect access to or management of public
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schools, health or other social services used by the general population. In 2002,
for example, Colorado voters rejected and Massachusetts voters approved
initiatives that mandated English language in the classroom. Though not a
spending issue per se, any prohibition on bilingual education implies budget
savings or, perhaps, more resources for other education programs. English‐only
policies disproportionately affect low‐income students, who are most likely to
speak a foreign language at home, though whether the effect on them is more
positive or negative is hotly debated.
Legislative referenda also cover a diverse range of issues that regularly
embrace fiscal affairs. Mandatory questions on proposed state bond issues are
very common. The New York State Constitution since 1846, for example, requires
statewide voter approval for the incurrence of public debt. Provisions for
mandatory questions on proposed levying or increases in taxes are found in
many state constitutions, as well (Zimmerman 2001: 26‐27, 230).

Pro‐poor Fiscal Policy
It is not hard to sketch the outlines of fiscal rules and budget systems that
serve the Millennium Goals. A recent British White Paper (DFID 2000) defines
“pro‐poor policies” as “decisions, programs and processes that put poor people
at the centre of development policy and focus on empowering and enabling poor
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people to take charge of their futures.” While this definition is too vague to have
operational meaning, it implies that pro‐poor budgets should meet two broad
standards.
First, fiscal outcomes ought to work for the have‐nots in society, not just
the haves. On the revenue side, taxes should be progressive (based on ability to
pay, with the rich paying a greater share of income) and high enough to pay for
an expansive public sector. Some borrowing is called for, particularly for capital
improvements to schools, hospitals and similar facilities. On the spending side,
pro‐poor budget outcomes mean generous funding to run social service
programs. Finally, income and expenditure should be roughly in balance to avoid
long‐term credit problems, which might disrupt social services in the future.
The second criterion of a pro‐poor fiscal policy is that an inclusive process
exists for establishing tax, debt and expenditure priorities. Recognizing that “the
poor” is a diverse category, we should observe widespread access to and
participation in fiscal policy. Elites should not dominate budget decisions.

Fiscal Outcomes
To what extent has U.S. direct democracy met the first standard of pro‐
poor fiscal policy, that it have egalitarian results? Many successful fiscal
initiatives in the United States are aimed to limit taxes (often to make them more
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regressive, too) and cap government spending. These fiscal constraints generally
reward the well‐to‐do and penalize the working poor and the unemployed, who
tend to pay few taxes while making heavy use of government services.
California’s famous Proposition 13 is a case in point. Passed in 1978, this
ballot question provides property tax relief for homeowners – few of whom
would classify as low‐income. Kuttner (1980) called the initiative a “revolt of the
haves” in the title of his book on Proposition 13. Upset by rising property taxes,
California voters opted to check the capacity of local governments to raise
revenue, which forced cuts in municipal services, including schools.
There is not much for socially excluded individuals in this popular law.
Proposition 13 encourages local governments to favor retail development, which
produce sales‐tax receipts, over other residential or commercial projects, which
might provide housing and jobs but only limited property‐tax payments. A key
feature of Proposition 13 allows reassessments to market value only when a
property changes hands, creating an incentive for property owners to sit on real
estate they might otherwise want to sell. Moreover, owners can deed their homes
to children or other close relatives without changing the assessments. Therefore,
Proposition 13 rewards established property‐owning families at the expense of
first‐time homebuyers, who must pay market‐rate property taxes. With the
supply of new and used housing artificially restricted, and prices soaring, non‐
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property owners also have an increasingly difficult challenge breaking into
Californiaʹs housing market. Finally, commercial proprietors gain
disproportionately from Proposition 13, because they tend to hold onto their
properties for long periods (Schrag 1998).
Populist mythology to the contrary, law‐making assemblies are not averse
to restricting taxes or putting a cap on spending. One study finds, however, that
tax and expenditure limitations enacted by state legislatures are apt to be less
restrictive and contain more loopholes than those passed by citizen initiative
(New 2001). Sometimes elected representatives limit taxation to preempt possible
petition drives. For example, when faced with the likelihood that an initiative
known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights would succeed in the upcoming election,
the Colorado Legislature passed a new statutory expenditure limit in 1991.
Another scenario is for the executive to use the initiative process to discipline or
bypass a recalcitrant legislature. That is what happened in 2000 in Massachusetts,
when the Republican Governor backed a tax‐cut initiative (which the voters
ultimately approved) after Democratic legislators balked at similar tax cuts,
fearing the repercussion on social and education expenditures.
Such events do not mean that every tax initiative is an attack on the poor,
or that the body of voters supports every proposal to hinder government’s taxing
authority. The passage rate for citizen tax initiatives is roughly one in three –
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about the same rate as all citizen initiatives. Legislative referenda on revenue
issues likewise have varied results. The Initiative and Referendum Institute
(2000: 3‐4) reports the following outcomes from the last Presidential Election
year:
Tax cutters suffered some big defeats with voters in Alaska (property tax
relief), Colorado (lower taxes on certain items) and Oregon (allowing for
the full deduction of federal income taxes off your state taxes) choosing
not to go along with these changes. However, these losses are offset by big
victories in Massachusetts (reducing income taxes), South Dakota
(abolishing the inheritance tax) and in Washington State (declaring null
and void certain tax or fee increases adopted without voter approval by
state and local governments).
The electorate is much more willing to endorse additional government
borrowing than it is to approve tax hikes. In 2002, for example, voters around the
United States approved nearly 86% of bond authorizations considered on ballots.
Two‐thirds of the bonds would finance education facilities (Finestone 2002).
School construction projects are likely to help reduce poverty, all other things
being equal. But the debt does need to be repaid, so there are opportunity costs
for other pro‐poor programs.
Voters are also amenable to greater government spending – though again
without necessarily considering how to pay for it. A good recent example is
California’s After School Education and Safety Program Act (2002). The act,
which had noteworthy support from actor (later Governor) Arnold
Schwarzenegger, intends to make after‐school programs available to every child
14

in California’s elementary, middle or junior high school. This is clearly a pro‐poor
outcome, but since the initiative does not provide any new revenues, funding
will have to come out of other government programs. Poor people may not be
net beneficiaries once these other cutbacks are factored in.
On balance, successful initiatives seem particularly tilted against the poor.
Some of the most striking proof for this assertion comes from Matsusaka’s (1995)
comparison of initiative states and referendum‐only states over a 30‐year period.
He discovered that initiatives led to significantly lower taxes and spending, after
controlling for other factors. In initiative states, broad‐based taxes were lower
than in referendum‐only states, while fees for services (such as state college
tuition) were higher. Lascher et al. (1996) also find evidence that initiative states
have less progressive taxation systems than other states. In addition, initiative
states spend less on welfare and public education.6
A final adverse outcome from direct budgetary participation is its
tendency to undermine fiscal discipline. Alt et al. (2001) report that initiative
states have significantly higher public debt than other states. Unchecked deficit
spending has potentially harmful repercussions on all residents, including the
poor.

6

Also see Zax (1989). Camobreco (1998) makes a contrary finding.
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Again, California illustrates the problems. Voters there have taken away
government revenue and mandated new government programs (as the after‐
school program mentioned earlier). The burden of budget cuts must then fall
entirely on the unprotected areas of the budget, which is bound to rile one
constituency or another. Caught it a fiscal squeeze, the state has tried to buy time
through extra borrowing, but the day of financial reckoning must eventually
come. California’s credit rating is currently the lowest of any U.S. state’s – just
above “junk bond” status (Kasler 2003). Were a developing country to follow
similar policies, the international financial institutions would undoubtedly insist
that it adopt a structural adjustment program to bring revenues into line with
expenditures.

Inclusive Decision Processes
What about the second criterion of pro‐poor fiscal policy, whether
economically disadvantaged persons have an important say in deciding the
amounts and purposes of government spending? Again, U.S. direct democracy
comes up short. Poor people are prone to be inactive bystanders in election
contests over public finance.
Because they may not be registered to vote, many low‐ and medium‐
income adults are ineligible to sign the petitions that qualify initiatives. We
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should not romanticize how these qualification drives work, either. As a rule,
registered voters are the targets, not the sources of initiative campaigns. Most
qualifying initiatives originate from an interest group or a wealthy individual –
some of whom, such as George Soros, are actually quite sympathetic to poor
people’s issues (Broder 2000). Successful volunteer drives to circulate petitions
and gather signatures are rare. A careful reading of history reveals this is nothing
new: No Golden Era of volunteerism ever existed for the initiative process (Smith
and Lubinski 2002). Special interests and paid experts have always dominated
the qualification stages of ballot questions.
The signature‐gathering phase is intended to weed out frivolous
proposals. Yet, individuals sign ballot petitions for many reasons, and their
signature need not signify a favorable opinion about the substance of the request.
Many qualification campaigns try not to describe issues in too much detail.
Often, people endorse a proposed question simply because they think voters
ought to have the opportunity to decide the issue later. Therefore, it is entirely
possible for fiscal questions that enjoy thin or lukewarm support to qualify for
the ballot – where they always have a chance of prevailing due to the vagaries of
voters’ behavior.
Once an initiative has been qualified, or a referendum readied for popular
approval, every citizen must make three important decisions: whether to vote at
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all, whether to vote on the ballot question, and how to vote on the question
should he or she choose to answer it. American election turnout is low by
international benchmarks, and people of lower socio‐economic status are the
most likely to abstain. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) fewer than
four in ten eligible voters living in families whose total income is under $10,000
report voting, compared with more than 70% of those with a family income over
$50,000. Some evidence suggests that the presence of propositions on a ballot
may give a slight boost to overall voter turnout (Tolbert et al. 2003). It is doubtful
this would have much effect on the fraction of low‐income people registering
and showing up on Election Day, however.
The voting disparity between rich and poor is especially pronounced for
initiatives and referenda. There is a well‐known phenomenon of “voter drop‐off”
– the tendency for voters to skip the ballot questions. The drop‐off rate runs
between 10% and 20% (Magleby 1984: 86). Studies show that voters with lower
incomes are somewhat more likely to behave this way, preferring to vote only for
the candidates for public office (Cronin 1989: 76‐77). The drop‐off problem,
combined with skewed voting rates, mean the citizenry does not join equally on
deciding most ballot propositions.
It is nonetheless conceivable that the final tally on a proposition does
reflect poor people’s preferences, if the issue cuts across class lines and the
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wealthier voters take a stand similar to that of the silent or absent citizens from
the other end of the income distribution. Research suggests this rosy scenario is
rare. For one thing, tax and spending policies produced by ballot questions need
not reflect majority public preferences in the state. The largest part of society
often likes alternative fiscal policies better than the ones endorsed by a majority
of voters (Camobreco 1998). In a study of California propositions, socioeconomic
class was found to affect marginally the likelihood that a voter will end up on the
losing side of a ballot question. Poorer voters fare somewhat worse than
wealthier voters do, though the relationship is too weak to draw firm conclusions
(Hajnal et al. 2002).

Understanding the Pattern of Participation
While U.S. reformers of the early 1900s were not primarily concerned with
poverty reduction, they would likely be surprised by how the initiative and
referendum have worked in practice. Citizen involvement in fiscal policy has
generally failed to “soak the rich” or to reduce deficit spending. Nor have ballot
questions proven effective devices for educating and mobilizing low‐status
individuals to articulate and defend their main financial and economic concerns.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that direct democracy as practiced in the United
States has an anti‐poor policy bias. No single factor can fully explain why direct
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democracy has led to these outcomes, but there are several partial explanations.
Here are some possibilities, in no particular order:
Influence of money: Money is critical in qualifying ballot questions. Most
initiatives never make it through the qualification stage. Between 1988 and 2000
in Oregon, for example, just one in eight volunteer‐only initiatives succeeded in
becoming certified for the ballot. Among the groups for whom money was no
obstacle, however, the success rate in qualifying questions approached 100%
(Ellis 2002: 50). The cost of placing an initiative on the ballot varies depending on
the state, but averages around $1 million in California, the most expensive state
(Waters 2003). Poor people’s organizations may not have deep enough pockets to
participate effectively in the preliminary steps of the initiative process.
The power of money is even more evident in defeating ballot questions
that have been qualified. As Waters (2003) explains, all the opposition needs to
do is spend substantial sums raising doubt about what the proposition might do,
which prompts the voters to cast a no vote because they want to be cautious. In
1998, $400 million was spent on ballot measures across the country, much of it for
media and public relations (Engle 2000). Anyone without funds to buy television
and radio time, to pay for direct mailings and phone calls, or to canvass door‐to‐
door is at a marked disadvantage in getting out a message on a ballot question.
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For sure, the high‐spending side does not invariably get its way on fiscal
or other matters put to the public. In Oregon in 1996, for instance, the tobacco
industry was unable to block a cigarette tax increase despite outspending
proponents by ten to one (Gerber 1999: 61). On balance, however, well‐heeled
groups have a strong edge in stopping ballot questions they believe will hurt
their business or other interests. Poor citizens tend to be onlookers not
participants in these struggles.
Lack of organization: The individualistic goals of populism and
progressivism notwithstanding, we should not expect unorganized amateurs to
determine what questions make it onto the ballot – any more than we should
expected amateurs to control the legislative process. Gerber (1999) dubs the
professionalization of direct democracy the “populist paradox.” In truth, there is
nothing illogical or inconsistent about elites and experts taking over the initiative
process. Direct lawmaking takes planning, and established groups are in the best
position to sponsor ballot issues and garner support for them.
Poor citizens tend to lack organizational assets that might capitalize on
their numbers and offset their financial disadvantage. They are disunited because
of language, culture and religion. They no longer work in large worksites and
factories, where they might develop a common awareness or class‐consciousness.
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It is therefore hard to rally them around complicated fiscal issues. They cannot
compete on an even footing with better‐led, better‐prepared groups.
Uncertainty about the issues: With respect to most political issues and
economic policies, the average American voter is badly informed. Some evidence
suggests that the initiative process may lead to greater general political
knowledge among the electorate (Tolbert et al. 2003). Nonetheless, ballot
questions are the subject of widespread confusion and misunderstanding. Less‐
educated, lower‐income people are the least likely to be familiar with the
complex implications of many specific questions, which adds to their low voting
and high drop‐off tendencies, discussed earlier.
On ballot questions, constituents also have trouble translating their views
into votes, leading many to vote against their intentions. For example, 60% of
Massachusetts voters agreed in principle with a graduated state personal income
tax. But when faced with the actual language of a proposition to introduce a
graduated income tax, support dropped to 43% (Magleby 1984: 116). Because of
education level, a lower‐income person probably has a greater likelihood of
making this type of mistake.
Confusing language: Contributing to the air of confusion, many ballot
questions are very long and written in technical language. Sometimes the
wording is ambiguous or deceptive on purpose. Seldom is it obvious what the
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effect of a positive or negative vote will be. Like most people, low‐income
citizens rarely look carefully at the official brochures provided by government to
provide objective information on ballot questions.
Misleading campaigns: Additional obfuscation comes from the opposing
campaigns, with their pollsters, media experts and political strategists.
Adversaries on a ballot question will distort and simplify, raise peripheral issues
and play on the voters’ prejudices and fears. Voices that seek merely to illuminate
and clarify the issues may be drowned out or ridiculed. To the extent that a poor
person relies on television for political information, he or she is more likely to be
taken in by political advertising.
Economic “irrationality.” Even if poor people were well‐informed and
they voted in large numbers, there is no guarantee they would support their
“objective” interests on ballot questions. Voters try to satisfy many values in the
voting booth, not simply to maximize personal income. For example, an
overwhelming number of South Dakotans repealed the state’s inheritance tax,
even though just a handful of wealthy residents ever paid it. The loss in revenue
contributed to a state budget deficit the first year it took effect. Perhaps voters in
South Dakota were motivated by a sense of fair play or by respect for the
deceased, rather than by their own pocketbooks.
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Apathy: Low‐income Americans often feel powerless and alienated from
the political system. Experience has taught them that politics has no effect on
their lives. Ballot questions do not change these attitudes very much. The barrage
of overstated charges and countercharges on some propositions may conceivably
reinforce a widespread sense of skepticism or indifference about voting.

Strengthening the Voice of the Poor
There are no easy ways to tinker with the U.S. model of direct democracy
to open it up to persons from the lower income brackets. One seeming solution
would be to impose spending limits or provide public funding to level the field
for ballot measures. At present, most states only require that donations be
reported, but without caps. The difficulty, however, is that any regulation of
political spending would favor the status quo, since it is less expensive to block
an initiative than it is to pass one. Control of political advertising might also
violate constitutional protection of free speech. U.S. experience with campaign
finance reform for presidential and congressional elections suggests that private
money would probably find its way back into the initiative and referendum
process, anyway.
Another reform that looks good at first glance would be to use the Internet
to qualify ballot questions. The United Nations (2003) has been particularly
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interested in E‐government, but the approach is problematic. On‐line petitioning
would obviously help financially strapped groups gather the necessary
signatures. The drawback would be many more propositions cluttering the
ballot, introducing even more mystification and apathy than exists under the
current system. Besides, poor people are the least likely people to have access to
the Internet.
Given these snags, emerging market countries should not look to
countrywide direct democracy as a wonder drug to reduce poverty or stabilize
national fiscal policy. A more reliable approach would be to strengthen the
standard representative institutions of governance. U.S. state governors have
sometimes stood up on matters of social equity, and the judiciary has
occasionally defended marginalized groups by declaring voter‐initiated laws too
vague or unconstitutional. Even the legislative branch has proven the better
safeguard of poor people’s interests compared with the initiative process.
Legislatures are likely to lean more toward the poor when they reflect the full
range of public opinion. Regular political institutions could be bolstered through
electoral reform (proportional representation, mandatory voting), campaign
finance reform (public funds, spending caps), lobbying reform (public
disclosure) and term limits. In nations where big disparities exist in income and
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social status, however, new rules for representation might not make much of a
difference in poor people’s influence.
The progressives and populists who introduced direct democracy
overestimated the political capacity of individuals. Because better organized
groups in society usually try take advantage of the less organized, real power for
the poor depends on their having strong organizations. The most influential
political participation does not take place one‐by‐one in the ballot box, but
collectively through groups that speak up for specific constituencies. Solitary
people lack the time or expertise to monitor and intelligently challenge ballot
proposals – and ordinary legislation, too. They need organizational help to
assemble and communicate their interests. The U.S. experience with direct
democracy shows what can happen to poor people who lack effective agents
working on their behalf.
Labor unions once fulfilled this advocacy function for lower‐income
Americans. Even today, unions can stop ballot initiatives when they marshal
their members, as occurred with the recent “payroll protection” initiative in
California (Broder 2000). However, union membership is down in the United
States, and unions have not been as active recently in grassroots organizing as
they have in the past. Conditions may be different in some developing or
transitional countries today. Community organizations, charities and churches
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are other types of organizations that frequently lobby on behalf of the poor –
both in the United States and around the world.
The United Nations (2003) has been encouraging participation of civil
society in government meetings and workshops. But poor people’s organizations
are likely to have greater success by seeking alliances with middle‐class groups
outside of government, to identify and promote fiscal programs with broad
political appeal. While the give‐and‐take of pressure group politics is never
reliably pro‐poor, societies are unlikely to move toward the Millennium Goals
unless there is a wide coalition of support for anti‐poverty policies that includes
sympathetic elements of the middle and upper classes.
Stable political parties, particularly those with a leftwing ideology and a
working class or peasant membership base, have been another important
element in pro‐poor government programs around the world (Moore and Putzel
1999). One of the incongruities of U.S.‐style direct democracy is that it was
consciously intended to weaken parties. That is exactly what has happened
(though there are many causal factors, not just direct democracy). The Democrats
in particular have grown fragmented and undisciplined. When U.S. political
parties were more united, propositions did not stand as much of a chance of
making it to the ballot. Politicians saw citizen‐enacted legislation as a threat to
their control and took steps to head off ballot questions. Nowadays, party leaders

27

often use the initiative and referendum process to gain partisan advantage. The
poor seem to fare better under a less directly participatory, but more predicable,
partisan system for establishing budget priorities.

Conclusion
U.S. direct democracy has not furnished “power to the people” in quite
the ways its original advocates hoped. The privileged few, not the common
citizens, have taken the greatest advantage of these plebiscitary institutions.
Resulting fiscal policies have often been imprudent about balancing government
income and expenditure. Populist reformers elsewhere in the world would be
advised to come to terms with these facts ahead of time so they will avoid the
mistakes made in the United States.
Responsible and pro‐poor citizen participation works best through
organizations, including political parties and membership‐based groups.
Organizations are in a better position than individuals are to look at the tradeoffs
among taxation, debt and spending, rather than treating these issues in isolation.
When have‐nots band together, they can have more bearing on budget decisions
than they can on their own, trying to make up their minds whether to sign an
initiative petition or to vote yes on a ballot question. Giving each voter a specific
say in fiscal matters is no substitute for collective action. Mainstream
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representative institutions are usually the most promising avenues for arriving at
prudent, pro‐poor budget decisions.
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